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# How the Palestinian intifada influences the U.S. media coverage of the Middle East conflict

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How the Palestinian *intifada* influences the  
U.S. media coverage of the Middle East conflict

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by

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A Thesis Submitted to the  
Graduate Faculty in Partial Fulfillment of the  
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**DEDICATION**

**To my son, Almekdam**

**To the children of Palestine**

**To the children of stones**

**To Palestine's children who rewrite the history of their national struggle**

## CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

It is easy for each of us, as human beings, to accuse people with whom we disagree of being "biased." Although there is no one scientifically accepted criterion by which to determine bias, there have been a variety of definitions and explanations of news bias provided by researchers, theorists and scholars.

According to the Oxford Dictionary, bias means "leaning of the mind toward or away from something; predisposition." News coverage bias has been the focus of many studies. Cirino (1968) categorized the hidden bias types as follows: (1) bias in the source, (2) bias through selection, (3) bias through omission, (4) bias through placement, (5) bias through coincidental placement, (6) bias in headlines, (7) bias in words, (8) bias in photograph selection, (9) bias in captions, (10) bias in use of editorials to distort facts, and (11) bias in interviewing. To develop a list of the words used as synonyms or antonyms for reportorial bias, Doll and Bradley (1974) surveyed journalism textbooks. They found such synonyms as "preferential, loaded, partisan, one sided, close minded, opinionated, warped, slanted, distorted, colored, dressed-up, indirect, partial, hints, touched up, angled, special pleading, prejudiced, manipulatory, editorializing, stereotyped, prepossessing, dishonest, and subjective." They also found that antonyms for bias were "open mindfulness, quantified, honest, straight-forward, equally forceful, factual, factually accurate, neutral, truthful, fair, and objective" (p. 256). Some researchers have defined objectivity as the opposite of bias. The concept of bias versus objectivity in the news media is frequently associated with



political and ideological impact (Hackett , 1985). On November 25, 1968, in the CBS broadcast, *60 Minutes*, Walter Cronkite said that "objectivity is when one tries to be objective." Doll and Bradley (1974) defined bias as "the absence of objectivity" (p. 256). Hackett further noted that the concept of news bias has two elements. One is a lack of "balance" between competing viewpoints; the other is a tendentious, partisan editorial of reality (1985, p. 252).

According to Hofstetter and Buss (1978) another aspect of bias is selectivity "which may or may not lead to the unbalanced, inequitable or unfair treatment of individuals or issues" (p. 518). They explained that "when reporters are accused of being biased, they are selecting facts to represent a story so that the end results are unbalanced, inequitable or unfair" (p. 518). Obviously reporters, editors, and producers are the ones who usually choose, omit, or interrelate facts. "Any time one abstracts or generalizes, one is selecting certain details rather than others"(p.518) Therefore, choosing, omitting, or interrelating facts in some coherent way are based on judgment of relevance, which "is determined by journalists' view of the world" (Hofstetter and Buss, 1978, p. 518).

If news coverage is limited by pressure of time and space, the limitations of news coverage are much worse within events relating to historically controversial issues. The current issue in the Middle East, that is, the conflict between the Arabs and the Israelis, is a labyrinth. Religion, culture, politics, history, geography and racism are all various dimensions of the Middle East conflict. The problem is that the world community listened only to one side and gave no attention to the other side of this conflict. Arnold Toynbee said that "right and wrong are the same in Palestine as anywhere

else. What is peculiar about the Palestine conflict is that the world has listened to the party that committed the offense and has turned a deaf ear to the victims" (Kayyali, 1979, p. 5).

In the U.S. particularly, the media have portrayed Arabs negatively, while Israel has been portrayed positively. According to Asi, "this negative exposure was prevalent in all mass media. From elementary school textbooks to the *New York Times* and television entertainment, Americans were exposed consistently to messages which tended to portray the Arabs negatively" (p. 45). In contrast, he states that "Israel and Israelis enjoy sympathy among most Americans and were portrayed more often than not in a favorable light. Israeli actions, regardless of how crude and brutal they might be, were presented and explained as 'justified self defense,' or 'retaliation' to Arab provocations" (Asi, 1981, p. 45).

### Causes and Effects

This conflict cannot be separated from the historical heritage of controversy and opposition between Western philosophy and the Islamic-Arab philosophy. Although the conflict in the Middle East involves Israelis and Palestinians, it is also a struggle between two cultures; the Islamic-Arab culture on one side and the Western culture on the other. The struggle of Palestinians against Israeli occupation is only one chapter in the long book of conflict.

The controversy began as Islam emerged in Western Asia, and since the Middle Ages, the West has had a suspicious attitude toward Islam, its prophet, and its holy book. "There the prophet is generally displayed as an

imposter, a false prophet, al-Koran as his pretentious fabrication and Islam as a licentious way of life, both here and in the next world" (Hitti, 1979, p. 48). Oxtobys (1980) believed that the first negative stereotypes about Islam emerged in the seventeenth-century translation of al-Koran by Alexander Ross, in which he cautioned readers of the "danger in reading al-Koran" (p. 3).

As fear, hostility, and prejudice grew, evoking action and reaction among Europeans and Moslems, perhaps the bloodiest chapter was written at the time of the Crusades. "The first Crusade began in 1095 after the Byzantines—threatened by Seljuk power—appealed to Pope Urban II for military aid. Pope Urban, hoping to divert the Christian King and princes from their struggles with each other . . . and to reunite the Eastern and Western churches, called for a Truce of God among the rulers of Europe and urged them to take the Holy Land from the Muslims" (Nawwab, Speers and Hoye, 1981, p. 81).

Another stage in the conflict was the British-French colonization of the Middle East, including the area known as Palestine. This colonization occurred as an outcome of the First World War and the consequent fragmentation of the Ottoman Empire (Hitti, 1979). Since the end of World War II, all British colonies in the Arab World were relinquished except Palestine. Subsequent to many Jewish attempts with several European nations, British Foreign Minister Balfoure in 1917 promised a Jewish home in Palestine. This later came to be known as the Balfour Declaration. On November 29, 1947, the United Nations authorized a Palestine-partition plan that gave a part of Palestine to the Jews. In 1948, Israel was recognized as a

Jewish state by U.S. President Harry Truman. "This development occurred against the will of the indigenous Palestinian people and against the acceptance of the Arab masses" (Asi, 1981, p. 9).

This partition was accomplished after many previous attempts by the Zionist Movement—the organization that has occasioned much controversy and protracted debate over its aims and historic roots. Although the explicit aim of this organization was "to create a Jewish nationalism expressed in the form of a Jewish national state in Palestine" (Gainsborough, 1986, p. 3), there are people who argue that it is "a colonial movement based on racist, supremacist and distant religious notions perceived and launched as a political project within the imperialist framework of late nineteenth and early twentieth-century Europe" (Kayyali, 1979, p. 5). In fact, the United Nations Resolution 3379 of November 1975 concluded debate by declaring that Zionism was a form of racism and racial discrimination (Kayyali, 1979).

Although the Jewish state already held 55 percent of Palestinian land, the Zionists' dream was to control the surrounding Arab land. Theodore Hertzl, the founder of the Zionist Movement, described the Jewish State as extending ". . . from the Brook of Egypt to the Euphrates" (Epp, 1970, p. 15). "With the Palestine War in 1948, an additional 22 percent of this land was incorporated into the newly self-proclaimed state of Israel. In the 1967 war, the territories under the Israeli control were further extended to include all the land west of Jordan, plus the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights of Syria" (Epp, 1970, p. 14). Israel also invaded Lebanon in 1982 and is still occupying the southern part of this country.

There is no indication that the historical gap between Western culture and the Islamic culture will be narrowed or ended anytime soon. On the contrary, Shah (1990), editor of the *Eastern Times of Washington, D.C.* pointed out that "the Muslim anger against the West is derived mostly from specific acts and policies of Western nations, which leave the perception that justice and fairness do not matter when the lives of Westerners are not at stake." Shah says that the 1990 "summit between the two superpowers featured talk of a long era of confrontation giving way to an era of enduring cooperation. But in the Muslim world, there are fears that the end of the cold war will encourage a new cold war with the Muslim world" (p. 19). With the apparent end of the cold war, the Soviet Union is flooding Israel's immigrant population. Thousands of Soviet Jewish immigrants already have been forced to leave for Palestine and thousands more are expected to leave later. Agres (1990) reported that "at this moment, there are Jews in the USSR in possession of plane tickets for January 1991. The government's budget for the year 1991 took into account only 40,000 immigrants, but it is now clear that a realistic estimate would be 80,000-120,000, and possibly more" (p. 33).

Ironically, another factor that has made Israel seem to be the West's favorite son in the Middle East is a backlash against anti-Semitism, "attitudes and actions against Jews based on the belief that Jews are uniquely inferior, evil or deserving of condemnation by their very nature or by historical or supernatural dictates" (Grosser and Halperin, 1983, p. 5). Many Americans in the United States oppose Anti-Semitism and have tried to change such sentiments. Bell (1980) pointed out that "Americans have an automatic sympathy toward the Jews of Israel because of the Holocaust. One

could even say Americans feel guilt on the issue" (p. 56). The efforts to oppose anti-Semitism however, have indirectly and directly victimized other people. Some people are an easy target to be accused as anti-Semitic for political or cultural orientation, which has nothing to do with anti-Semitism attitudes. Caradon (1980) writes that "Anti-Semitism is one of the most evil things in the world, but the unjustified accusation of being anti-Semitic is also evil, and too frequently employed" (p. 80). The Arabs, as an Israeli's enemy in the Middle East, are among those targets. "An old anti-Semitism directed against the Semitic Jews now became a new anti-Semitism directed against the Semitic Arabs. As the old anti-Semitism terribly wronged the Jews, so the new anti-Semitism terribly wronged the Arabs" (Epp, 1970, p. 6). Even in American motion pictures there are indications that Arabs are treated as negatively as Jews were in Hitler's Germany. Shaheen (1986) says "The image of the Arab in most films parallels the image of the Jew in pre-Nazi Germany" (p. 1).

There is another factor that has contributed strongly to the negative Arab image in the American press. Despite their minority status in most countries, Jews play a dominant economic role. They have an active presence, whether in industrialized, developing, communist or capitalist countries. In the United States, Jews are believed by many people to play a decisive role at several levels.

Efforts by the pro-Israel lobby to influence American opinion and policy most often focuses on national institutions, particularly the federal government. Yet the lobby in its various forms branches quite widely into American life beyond the seat of government on the banks of the Potomac River. Local political leaders, businesses, organizations and private individuals in many fields experience unfair criticism and intimidation for

becoming involved in the debate over the Middle East issue" (Findley, 1985, p. 287).

Jews and their pro-Israeli supporters put pressure upon the U.S. Congress to achieve their goals in the Middle East. The Jewish lobbying effort can be accomplished in this country through more than 200 national groups, but perhaps the most powerful and effective foreign policy group is the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). Findely writes that "It has effectively gained control of virtually all of Capitol Hill's action on the Middle East policy. Almost without exception, House and Senate members do its bidding, because most of them consider AIPAC to be the direct Capitol Hill representative of a political force that can make or break their chance at election time" (p. 25). Paul N. "Pete" McCloskey is among the few public officials to reveal that the "Congress is terrorized by AIPAC" (Findley, 1985, p. 27).

If the Jewish Israeli lobbyists have been able to exert pressures and influence upon the highest institutions of the decision-making process in the United States, it would not be unreasonable to suppose that they influence many segments of the private sector as well, including the American mass media. This influence may be the result of the ideology and background of the journalists, broadcasters and producers of the news media. In his study of American news decision-makers, Lichter (1981) found "a widespread commitment to Israel among the media elite. Of the 238 respondents in his study, 235 were willing to express an opinion about this commitment. Fully 72 percent agreed that the U.S. was morally obligated to defend Israel, with more than one in the three respondents indicating strong agreement with that proposition" (p. 43). In another study, Epstein pointed out that 58 percent

of the network producers and editors he interviewed were of Jewish descent (1973, pp. 222-23).

As Israel has attacked and threatened several Arab countries (Lebanon, Iraq, Tunisia) during the last 15 years, with the blessing and sometimes the encouragement of the U.S., frustration, anger and anti-American sentiments have been generated in the Arab World. These sentiments, which have been transformed into direct actions such as the taking of American hostages, kidnapping and other terrorist activities, have frequently dominated U.S. media coverage of the Middle East at the expense of ignoring fundamental issues in the region such as the Israeli occupation of the Arab lands. International news is usually seen from a national angle. Adams and Heyl (1981) noted that "International news anywhere in the world tends to be ethnocentric. Foremost, people are concerned about their own country and its place in the world. In the U.S., international relations usually means bilateral relations between the U.S. and any other country" (p. 13).

Although most studies of the American media coverage of the Middle East have concluded that the national media have treated the Israelis more favorably than the Arabs (Howard, 1967; Farmer, 1968; Suleiman, 1965, 1970; Wagner, 1973; Zaremba, 1977), several recent studies suggest a gradual shift toward more neutral coverage or more positive portrayals of the Arab nations (Asi, 1981; Belkaoui, 1978; Gordon, 1975). Some researchers have attributed such a shift to specific events in the Middle East during the last 18 years.

There have been many Arab-Israeli wars in the last 42 years. But, it was the 1973 war that provoked the Arab oil embargo against any nation that



supported Israeli aggression and this drew much of the media attention to the Middle East. Peter Jennings, the ABC Middle East correspondent, admitted that "more coverage has been given to Israel's side than to that of the Arab." This situation, however, he said "began to change, not dramatically perhaps, but substantially after the October war in 1973 and particularly after the Arab oil embargo" (Ghareeb, 1983, pp. 127-28).

Others have suggested more recent events that have contributed to such a shift. They cite, for example, Egyptian president Anwar el-Sadat's visit to Israel in 1977 (Bagnied and Schneider, 1981) and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon (Roeh, 1981).

With few exceptions, most of these studies have dealt with one-time events. The media coverage of an extraordinary event may not reflect a long-term change in editorial policy of the news decision-makers. For example, although Israel's activities in Southern Lebanon during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon received unfavorable coverage in the U.S. media, other Israeli attacks in different areas or at different times were not treated similarly. In other words, the invasion of Lebanon and the Egyptian president's visit to Israel in 1977 are extraordinary events, where media have little if any role to play over the events.

### Study Focus

The current study deals specifically with the U.S. television coverage of the Middle East. Television is an effective news medium, especially in the United States. Barnouw (1978) said that "Most Americans now depend mainly on the television for information about what's going on in the world

today. Most people say they trust television more than any other news medium, and many seem to rely almost wholly on television" (p. 1). Television's power comes basically from its combined visual and verbal content. Television is a two-channel medium. Both channels function as one outlet and convey one content. Kepplinger (1982) indicates that "the two will present the same or a similar picture of reality. . . . If there are significant differences between verbal and visual content, only one of the two presentations can be appropriate" (pp. 391-92). Thus, verbal and visual contents should reinforce each other to avoid a possible lack of neutrality and credibility. Although the network personnel hold substantial power over the pictures they broadcast, Adams (1978) pointed out that "They exert much less overt control over the part of the visual image emerging from the news happening itself (event factors)" (p. 156). Adams defines the event factors as "those that are outside of direct network control" (p. 156).

For the purpose of this study, a content analysis of three American commercial television networks (ABC, CBS, NBC) will be conducted. To determine whether there may be a possible long-term shift in U.S. television coverage of the Middle East conflict, or whether such a shift is derived from one-time event coverage, an "event factors" approach will be applied during two different time periods:

1. One year before the Palestinian uprising (December 1, 1986-November 30, 1987) which is considered in this study an ordinary event period.
2. The first year of the Palestinian uprising (January 1988-December 30, 1988) which is considered in this study an extraordinary event period.

## CHAPTER II. BACKGROUND

### The Palestinian Uprising *Intifada*

If indeed the pictures of present conflicts can be manipulated by journalists and their tools, it would be fair to say that the picture of conflicts in the past might have been manipulated by historians and their tools.

On the eve of the termination of the British mandate over Palestine in May 1948, members of the people's council and representatives of the Jewish community of Eretz-Israel and of the Zionist Movement, in accordance with their "natural and historic right" and on the strength of the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly proclaimed the State of Israel (Cattan, 1988) (see Appendix A).

If historic rights justify occupation of a land and expulsion of its people, many nations and peoples would disappear from the maps of the world.

Although the concept of an "Israel state" was generated and developed based on the Jewish claim of historic right to Palestine, a careful view of history reveals little support for this claim. Unlike the Palestinians, the Jews are not descendants of the land's original inhabitants: The Jews emigrated to Palestine from Egypt. Even though the Jews ruled the country for a time, they disappeared from Palestine altogether after the destruction of Israel and the Kingdom of Judah. Furthermore Jewish rule in Palestine did not last longer than the rules of other peoples. Professor Noth notes that the Israeli monarchy continued for two and a half centuries as an independent institution in the two states of Israel and Judah and for one century and a half in the vassal monarchy of Judah (Noth, 1970, p. 299). But "Christian

rule, Byzantine and Crusader, lasted four centuries while Moslem rule, Arab and Turkish, continued for twelve centuries” (Cattan, 1988, p. 18).

Another indication of the falsehood of the historical claim of Jews to Palestine is that before the creation of Israel, the Zionists nominated six countries to be chosen as a location for Israel. Zayad (1980) states that Uganda, Tripolitani in Libya, Cyprus, Madagascar, the Congo, and Palestine were all options explored as locations for the Zionist enclave. When the interest of European Imperialism, however, met the interest of Zionism, the choice fell on Palestine. In the minds of many, this state was designed to “form a part of a wall of defense for Europe in Asia, an outpost of civilization against barbarism” (Herzl, 1943, p. 30).

The international community has not always accepted claims by Jews to Palestine. In 1919 the Paris Peace Conference rejected the Zionist claim for recognition of a Jewish historic title to Palestine. Instead, the conference decided that Arab territories detached from Turkey should be administered by a mandate on behalf of the League of Nations. The historic right of the Jews in Palestine was also rejected by the British government, which had the Palestine mandate at that time (Cattan, 1988). As to the claim of the United Nations General Assembly resolution, “apart from its doubtful validity and legality, it was not respected because the state that emerged did not conform to the UN resolution on which it purported to be based, either demographically or territorially” (Cattan, 1988, p. 50).

Eventually, the Balfoure Declaration did support a Jewish homeland in Palestine. But although the British government expressed its support for establishing a Jewish “national home” in Palestine, both before and after the

acceptance of the mandate from the League of Nations, the British rejected the implication that a "national home" meant a Jewish state (Adams, 1979).

Although there were Zionists who were aware of the Palestinian population in Palestine and "tried to warn their colleagues against the danger of implanting a Jewish national entity on Arab soil" (Adams, 1979, p. 118), their viewpoint eventually was obscured from the world community, and the Palestinian people were dispossessed by the claim that "Land without people is for people without land." Contrary to this statement, the majority of the Palestine population was Arab. However, "The partition resolution allotted the proposed Jewish state 56 percent of the total area of Palestine at the time when Jewish ownership of the land did not exceed 6 percent of the total area" (Epp, 1970, p. 184). In 1919, the population of Palestine included about 65,000 Jews, many of whom were Arabized Jews of long standing, and about 650,000 Arabs. In 1922, the first official British census of Palestine, as well as later counts, revealed the population of each party (Table 1).

Jewish land ownership in Palestine was only about 2 percent in 1922. This figure had increased to about 5.67 percent in 1945, as shown in Table 2.

It was obvious from the beginning that such a state could be established only by violating the rights of the Arab population. And in fact the Arab majority was forcibly displaced and uprooted by a militant minority of foreign origin. Cattani points out that in 1948 "a million Palestinians were expelled or otherwise forced to leave their homes, towns and villages, were robbed of their lands, properties and possessions and became refugees without homes and without any means of livelihood" (p. 60). Said (1979) states that three and

Table 1. Statistical summary of the population in Palestine (1922-1937)<sup>a</sup>

Year	Moslem	Jews	Christians	Others	Total
1922	598,177	83,790	71,464	7,617	761,048
1924	627,660	94,945	74,094	8,263	804,962
1926	663,613	149,500	76,764	8,782	898,659
1928	695,280	151,656	79,812	9,203	935,951
1930	733,149	164,796	84,986	9,628	992,559
1932	771,180	180,793	90,624	10,281	1,052,872
1934	807,180	253,700	99,532	10,746	1,171,158
1936	848,342	370,483	106,474	11,219	1,336,518
1937	875,947	386,074	109,764	11,520	1,383,305

<sup>a</sup>*Palestine Blue Book* 1937. Jerusalem: Government Printer, 1937.

Table 2. Land ownership in Palestine (1945)<sup>a</sup>

Category	Acres	Percent
Individually owned by Arabs	3,143,693	74.79
Individually owned by Jews	372,925	5.67
Others	35,512	.54
Registered & recorded State Domain	3,028,625	46.00
Total	6,580,755	100

<sup>a</sup>Sami Hadawi, *Land Ownership in Palestine* 1957 (p. 12).

a half million Arabs have been scattered throughout the world. About 650,000 of those displaced are called Israeli Arabs—one million of whom live on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, another one million or so in Jordan, nearly 450,000 in Lebanon, and the balance dispersed throughout either the Gulf states, including Syria, Egypt, Libya, and Iraq, or in Europe and the Americas.

The conflict between the Arabs and the Israelis occurred as soon as the Jewish state came into being. The promises of equality of citizenship were exposed as false:

the question arose of who was entitled to live in the new state. Its boundaries had been extended far beyond those envisaged in the UN Partition Plan and the great majority of the Palestinians whose homes were within those boundaries fled into exile, some out of a simple instinct for self preservation, others because they had been forcibly expelled by the Israelis (Adams, 1979, p. 121).

Cattan (1988) attributes the exodus of the Palestinians in 1948 to three causes: Jewish terrorism, expulsion, and security breakdown. Adams (1979) posed an additional cause, which is legal machinery during the last few months of the mandate.

### Jewish terrorism

Although the Israeli authority forced some Palestinians to take refuge in neighboring Arab countries, the exodus started to assume catastrophic dimensions only after the outbreak of terrorism. The Dair Yassin massacre was calculated to terrorize Palestinians. According to Menachem Begin, former Prime Minister of Israel, because of the Dair Yassin Massacre, “the Arabs began to flee in terror . . . of about 800,000 Arabs who lived in the

present territory of the state of Israel, only some 165,000 are still there” (Begin, 1951, pp 164-5). Jewish terrorism was concentrated on villages populated mainly by Arabs.

### Expulsion

The expulsion of the Arabs occurred in several towns and villages and the Israeli authority prevented any official readmission of the Palestinians once expelled. Recent revelations in the Israeli press, however, have shattered the Israeli propaganda that the exodus of 1948 was either voluntary or ordered by the Arab states (Cattan, 1988).

### Breakdown of security before the end of the League of Nations mandate

The third cause of the exodus of the Palestine Arabs was the collapse of security and of the government's machinery. During the last six months of the mandate, and after the violence and terrorism following the UN Partition Plan, the British government was neither able to maintain law in the area nor willing to commit forces for that purpose (Cattan, 1988).

### Discriminatory laws

Adams (1979) states that for Arabs in Palestine, there could be no way to share, on equal terms, the benefits of a state structure designed to further the interests of the Jews. This inequality was reinforced by a series of laws, such as the Defense Laws, designed to reduce Arab participation in society. Along with the Defense Laws, there were laws of more far-reaching effects on Palestinians. "These laws were passed between 1948 and 1958 with the express aim of taking land away from its Arab owners and cultivators and



transferring it to Jewish control" (Adams, 1979, pp 125-6). There was also another law, termed the "Transfer Committee," which was designed to expel the Palestinians either to other areas under Israeli control or across the armistice lines into the neighboring Arab countries. Arabs living in what were called "security areas" were ordered to leave and forbidden to return. Once Arab-owned land was left uncultivated, it was expropriated under the "Emergency Articles for the Exploitation of Uncultivated Land" (Adams, 1979). Another law was the "Law of Prescription," enacted in April 1958, which stated that anyone claiming ownership of a piece of land must prove that he or she had controlled and cultivated that land for 15 years (Adams, 1979).

After 1967, the Israeli policy toward the Palestinians was based on the techniques used before and after the 1948 war. Adams (1979) enumerates the techniques of repression imposed upon the Palestinians after 1967:

1. detention without trial,
2. destruction of houses,
3. punitive curfews,
4. deportations, and
5. expropriation of land.

### The Palestinian Liberation Movements

It should first be noted that during the Ottoman empire, there were no frontiers defining Palestine. Instead, Palestine and its people were considered part of Ottoman-dominated Syria. Nevertheless, there were Palestinian nationals among the Syrian nationals. "After separation of

Palestine from Syria, with imposition of British hegemony on the country in the guise of a League of Nations Mandate, and aroused by the spectre of a rapidly rising and competitive Jewish nationalist movement, the Palestinians began to form their own separate national organizations" (Ward, Peretz and Wilson, 1977, p. 5).

Before reviewing the history of relevant national movements, it is essential to determine the identity of the Palestinians. The Arab character of Palestine and of the majority of its people, until recent years, in terms of language, culture, and historical background constitute an undeniable identity. Strong nationalist sentiment among the Palestinians from the beginning of the struggle has obviously received the backing from the surrounding Arab states and the goals of the Palestinians have been linked to those of Arab nationalists. Whereas most Palestinians were peasants and desert nomads or beduins, a small number of landowners and a middle class of businessmen dominated the society. These persons were wealthy, well-educated, and in close contact with Europeans. Overall, during the mandate period, income in Palestine had risen to the highest level in the Arab World (Ward, Peretz, and Wilson, 1977).

The political elite of Palestinian society faced traditional rivalries among the leading families—the two most influential being the Husainis and the Nashashibis (Ward, Peretz, and Wilson, 1977).

The first Palestinian resistance group was found in 1935 after the discovery of arms smuggling to the Hagana. The resistance was led by Sheikh Izz al-Din al-Qasam. In 1936, all Palestinians joined in a general strike against the British authority and boycotted the Jewish community. By

1938, organized Arab guerrillas had become powerful enough to take over many areas of Palestine. The Jewish community of Palestine at that time, however, was in a stronger position than it would be again before the end of World War II (Ward, Peretz, and Wilson, 1977).

Khouri (1983) summarizes the historical crossroads influencing the Palestinian struggle:

The trauma of the Arab defeat in 1948 temporarily paralyzed the Palestinians, politically and militarily. Soon, Palestinian political energies were channeled into the pan-Arab movement in the hope that a strong, unified Arab nation would help them liberate Palestine. . . . Following the breakup of the UAR in 1961 and the successful outcome of the Algerian revolution in 1962, some Palestinian nationalists began to organize commando units to advocate the liberation of Palestine through their own independent, armed struggle (p. 130).

According to Khouri, "after the Arab defeat in 1967, Palestinian nationalism intensified and spread, and new activist leaders took control of the PLO and the Palestinian national movement."

In the history of the Palestinian struggle, there has always been political competition between the nationalists and the Islamists. Although the Middle East has recently witnessed an upsurge in Islamic movements challenging corrupt governments in several countries, Islamic movements are as old as nationalistic movements. Palestine has not been immune to this phenomenon, of course, having witnessed in 1946 the first Muslim Brotherhood movement to be established in Jerusalem. Later in the same year, Musa al-Huseini established other like groups in Jaffa, Lydda, Haifa, Nablus, and Tulkarem (Cohen, 1982). This movement, which was welcomed by the nationalists, was not welcomed by all Arab governments (Shadid,

1988), but participation of Brotherhood volunteers in the 1948 war brought many Palestinian Moslems into the movement. After the Moslem Brothers Movement in Egypt attempted to assassinate President Gamal Abd al-Naser, the movement was banned in Gaza (at that time, Gaza was ruled by Egypt) and the movement's activities were forced underground. Since 1954, the movement has organized a series of underground groups to conduct armed actions against Israel. Some of its members later joined Fatah and became senior PLO leaders (Shadid, 1988). The Islamists' situation in the West Bank was quite different, however, because the movement's efforts were devoted only to teaching movement principles without any clandestine military activities. After the 1967 war and the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, military resistance against the Israeli occupation escalated as a result of the growing power of the PLO in Jordan. Resistance declined later, however, following the expulsion of PLO forces from Jordan in 1970-71 and Israel's deportation of West Bank Arab leadership (Shadid, 1988). Recently, the Iranian revolution has contributed to the reemergence of the Brotherhood in the Occupied Arab territories, as well as in the rest of the Middle East (Shadid, 1988).

To reunify and reorganize the Palestinian struggle, in 1964 a number of Arab states created the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which consists of several groups (Appendix B). The PLO and the Fatah began to be viewed as representatives of mainstream Palestinian thought. And gradually, the PLO transformed itself into the most authentic representative of the Palestinians and into the key political Palestinian force. Many changes in the Palestinian position have taken place since the creation of the

PLO; originally calling for the destruction of Israel, the group now advocates coexistence of states in Palestine. But Palestinian demands of all nationalist leaders, regardless of party or status, have remained the same: rejection of the British promise to create a Jewish state in Palestine, establishment of a national government responsible to a council elected by the Arabic speaking people of Palestine, cessation of land sales to Jews, withdrawal of recognition of Hebrew as an official language, and ban of the Zionist flag; in short, national independence under Arab control (Ward, Peretz, and Wilson, 1977).

Abu-Lughod (1990) indicates that within one decade the PLO achieved national, regional, and international legitimacy as the representative of the Palestinian people. Although the international influence of the PLO was limited, it became clear eventually that the PLO's participation in negotiations was central to diplomacy in the region. Since the 1973 war, several wars have broken out between the Palestinians and the Israelis. During these wars, most notably the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the PLO has had practice in leadership and has been able to enhance its effectiveness among Palestinians in the occupied Arab land as well as among Palestinians out of Palestine. Moreover, Palestinian decision makers have become increasingly independent in the absence of intervention by Arab leaders. "With the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, Israeli-Arab conflict was, little by little, turning into an Israeli-Palestinian conflict" (Gresh, 1983, pp 2-3).

On the other hand, growing international support for the Palestinian cause has promoted the PLO's integration into international diplomacy. On the eve of the 1973 war, the Non-aligned Movement Summit recognized the

PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinians. African nations have also, after about 20 years, begun to align themselves with Palestine instead of with Israel. Western Europe, hit by the oil embargo, reconsidered its position on the Palestinian question. The UN recognized the rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination, in 1970 and to struggle 1971. The USSR weighed heavily and directly on the debate with the PLO. All of these indications have given the PLO a central position in the history of modern Palestine (Gresh, 1983).

Abu-Lughod states that the Palestine National Charter, adopted in 1964 by the Palestine National Council, became the main constitutional document enabling the PLO to follow its strategies aimed at gaining Palestinian national rights. The primary concern of this charter is in regard to Israel and to Israel's Jewish population in Palestine. In the context of the Palestine National Charter, Palestinian rejection of Israeli statehood was and remains political rejection and denial of the legitimacy of Palestinian statehood and the return of the Palestinians to their homeland. Abu-Lughod also mentions that in November 1974, Yaser Arafat, chairman of the PLO, conveyed in his speech before the General Assembly a new proposal of coexistence between the two peoples. A gradual evolution in the Palestinian perspective was reflected in the PLO's political programs between 1977 and 1987. "This trend led inevitably to the adoption by the Council of the Political Program of 1988 and the Palestinian Declaration of Independence" (p. 257). Israel's response to these developments within the Palestinian movement was denial of the Palestinian right to self-determination, to representation by the PLO, to independence, and to sovereignty in any part of Palestine.

Said (1990) in a discussion of what has frustrated the Palestinians, states that the expropriations of land, the increasing control over water, and the encroachments of Jewish settlements are among the daily pressures under which Palestinians suffer. The Camp David Accords brought about no Palestinian independence as the U.S. and Israeli authorities had said. According to some analysts, what ensued was "a series of pointless negotiations with phantom Palestinian inhabitants from the occupied territories who could never be identified or promised anything" (p. 263). Said also indicates that, as time passed, the Israeli occupation of West Bank and Gaza hurt the Palestinians more and more. Among those particularly hurt were the students, because of the extended closing of schools and universities, and whose status was relatively subservient and whose salaries were much lower than those of Jewish workers.

There was a proliferation of over a thousand laws and regulations designed not only to enforce the subaltern, rightless position of the Palestinians under Israeli jurisdiction, but also to rub their noses in the mud, to humiliate and remind them of how they were doomed to less-than-human status. Books by the thousands were banned, the colors of the Palestinian flag were outlawed, even the word 'Palestine' could earn its user a jail sentence (1989, p. 263).

Shahak(1990), referring to a system of computerized magnetic identification cards issued in the West Bank and Gaza Strip states that "This totalitarian system, which should be called computerized tyranny, has no equivalent elsewhere in the world" (p. 15).

Abu-Lughod (1990) points out that "Israel's policy of political negation of any Palestinian initiative, coupled with a policy of terrible repression, exploitation, and continuing dispossession of the Palestinians, eventually led

to the *intifada* of the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza" (p. 261). At the same time, Palestinian economic hardship was an obvious factor in the uprising. It has been reported that the police in al-Nasera City found 40 Palestinian workers living in a two-room house (Ghallab, 1990).

Ghallab reports that according to Israeli policy in the occupied territories, when a crime is committed against Arabs by an Israeli, the Israeli Government either describes the criminal as a "mad" Israeli or records the crime against an anonymous person. David Ben Gurion described Begin and Shamir as "mad" men after their terrorist activity at the King David Hotel; but the two "mad" men later became respected Prime ministers of Israel. The crime of burning al-Aqsa Mosque was also committed by one such "crazy" man. On December 8, 1987, an Israeli truck driver attacked four Palestinians in their car and killed them. As usual, the crime was recorded against an anonymous person. This crime, however, was the spark that ignited the current four-year Palestinian *intifada* .

#### Rejection of the Status Quo

The Palestinians rejected the status quo through their *intifada* (popular uprising), an event that many analysts have described as a revolution. Bir Zayt University philosophy professor, Sari Nuseibeh, states that

the *intifada* is not just a Palestinian story, it is a human will, the strength of the national will, and the strength and the value of the call for freedom. It is a commonly held view now that 9 December 1987 witnessed what can be characterized as a great and spontaneous popular explosion, manifesting itself in the furious outpouring of unarmed masses into the streets, in brazen defiance of death itself (p. 16).



According to Talhami (1990), the *intifada* began as "pitiful acts of stone-throwing by Palestinian youths, otherwise unarmed, [which] quickly turned into a total civil war that, though fought with unequal armor, proved to be a serious threat to the occupying power" (p. 23).

The *intifada* has also contributed to national identity by encouraging dialogue across the factional fence and at the community level, among people from a variety of sectors and backgrounds. Despite the economic difficulty, 600 Palestinian police officers resigned from their jobs. To declare independence, "tens of thousands of activists, school teachers, unionists, student leaders, professors and others, were already in goal. But even inside the prisons, the process of organization and deliberation continued" (p. 16).

What surprised world observers most is that, within weeks of the *intifada* eruption, it was institutionalized as an organized challenge against Israeli authority. Therefore, the question arose as to who was behind the *intifada* .

While many Western and Israeli analysts of the relation between the Palestine Liberation Organization in Tunis and the internal leadership of the *intifada* have emphasized the political distance between the two leaderships, the PLO has reacted as responsibly to its constituency and as effectively as could have been anticipated, considering both its 2,000-kilometer distance from the occupied territories and Israeli obstacles to communication (Cobban, 1990).

Within five weeks of the outbreak of the uprising, the external [PLO] leadership had put into place an inside-the-territories coordinating mechanism that institutionalized the *intifada* and sustained a situation of effective dual power within the territories

throughout the two years of harsh Israeli countermeasures. The leadership's ability to do this stemmed from the appropriateness of the organizing strategies that the PLO—and in particular, Fatah's Khalil al-Wazir—had been pursuing in the territories through the previous four years (Cobban, 1990, p. 232).

It is believed that Abu-Jihad, the second in-command Khalil al-Wazir, was the man who consulted with, aided, and blessed the creation of the Unified Command, which consisted of four leaders, each representing one of the major Palestinian organizations within the Occupied Territories: Fatah, the Popular Front for Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), and the Palestinian Communist Party (PCP). Whereas the Unified Command was an inside-the-Occupied-territories coalition of four major nationalist groups, other nationalist groups active in the Palestinian Diaspora were not represented in this coalition, groups such as the financially supported Syrian and Iraqi group, *Saiqa*, the Arab Liberation Front, and other small groups such as the Palestine Popular Struggle Front and the Palestine Liberation Front.

Although Israeli officials have claimed to have the leaders of the *intifada* in custody, underground leaflets have remained an effective means of organizing and institutionalizing the uprising. Another tool that has ensured the continuation of the *intifada* has been communiqués broadcast via the Unified Command radio. The general purpose of the leaflets and the radio calls has been to give instructions regarding how to sustain the *intifada* challenge against the Israelis. These instructions have normally included general guidelines regarding how to reduce consumption of Israeli products, and how to deal with collaborators, as well as strike hours and a schedule of special events or remembrances. The total calls for strike have ranged from

three hours per day to five days per month. The Islamic Resistance Movement has also designated three strike days per month (Cobban, 1990, p. 209-210).

Although none of the Islamic movements was included in the Unified Command at the beginning of the *intifada*, the Islamists' role is becoming increasingly effective. The active Islamic political movements in the occupied territories are the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Jihad, which split off from the Brotherhood Movement in the mid-1960s.

The Unified Command, which had attempted at the beginning of the *intifada* to enlist the two major Muslim movements, welcomed the recent inclusion of both movements in its declarations. The relationship did not continue long, but the participation of Islamic Jihad in the *intifada* occurred in parallel with Unified Command efforts (Cobban, 1990).

Unlike Islamic Jihad, for the first few months of the *intifada*, the Brotherhood remained on the sidelines searching for a proper Muslim stance.

By August 1988, the most powerful local leader of the Brotherhood, Shaykh Ahmed Yasin, had reached a momentous decision. That month, he announced the formation of HAMAS, a new organization that would take a much more active role in the *intifada* than that which the Brotherhood had taken until then" (Cobban, 1990, p. 215).

Since this declaration, HAMAS participation has closely followed the Unified Command efforts, although some minor disagreements between the organizations remain. HAMAS has laid out a periodic timetable for its own strike days although because the children have lost so much education, the

organization does not insist that they observe the schedule of general strike days (Shadid, 1988).

Despite major differences particularly regarding the question of the liberation of all Palestine, including areas occupied in 1948, the Islamists and the nationalists agree that the sole Palestinian representative is the PLO. HAMAS has moved closer to the PLO and has markedly softened its view of PLO leadership, to the extent that the head of HAMAS now refuses to assume the role of the Palestinian representative or to negotiate independently of the PLO. Accordingly, Israeli authorities declared HAMAS a "terrorist organization" and arrested its head, Yasin (Cobban, 1990, p. 216).

Although the primary challenge to the Muslim Brotherhood came from the Islamic Liberation Party and from the Islamic Jihad, there are other Islamic Parties in Palestine. These are *hizb al-Tahreer al-Islami*, *al-Jihad al-Islami*, *Jamat al-Tabligh*, *Slafiyun al-Takfir wal-Hijra*, and *Sufis* (Shadid, 1988).

In its third year, the *intifada* headed in the direction of civil disobedience. In its fourth year, the *intifada* is heading rapidly towards military revolution. Through communiqué No. 65 of the Unified Command, the uprising has already received a new direction, which is the use of "all means" against the occupiers. Many estimate that the Palestinian *intifada* has reached the stage of no return. They come to this conclusion because the Palestinians have nothing to lose and because both the Jews and Arabs in Palestine agree that separation is the only solution. These developments have led to military revolution.

### CHAPTER III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW

Although many television news scholars believe that much of television's power and importance as a source of news comes from its visual impact, few content analyses of television news video have been conducted. Most of these studies have ignored visual images altogether, dealing only with the typed, transcribed content of the words spoken on the air. Adams (1978) categorized the visual images of television news as one of two types: production factors and event factors. By production factors, he referred to the aspects of the visual image by and large under "direct technical control of news personnel themselves, especially camera crews and editors." In contrast, event factors have nothing to do with the production dimension. Adams's definition of event factors is "those that are outside of direct network control" (p. 158). Adams says the President's pronouncement in the White House Rose Garden illustrates an event factor by that setting, along with such things as the President's appearance, clothes, manner, and remarks. These dimensions, according to Adams, are out of the media's control. Conversely, media personnel do have control over "close-ups, long shots, camera angles, cutaways, reaction shots, editing and juxtaposition" (p. 158). These, of course, are the production aspects of the final visual image that require technical and aesthetic decisions by network news-makers.

The literature review shows that little attention has been given to studying the event-factors approach to visual images in newscasts. Hofstetter (1976) gives attention to the nature of the 1972 U.S. presidential

campaign shown on the evening news. Stories about the fundamental political parties and campaign organizations have been classified according to whether crowds in the stories have been favorable toward the event. If a story included crowds in the pictures performing activities predominantly favorable to the campaign, the story would be classified as one including favorable crowds. Otherwise, it would be included in the "not favorable" classification. This category included stories neutral or ambiguous, as well as stories clearly unfavorable to the campaign efforts of the parties (1976, p. 126).

Hofstetter found that crowds were more frequently favorable in stories about Republican party efforts than in stories about Democratic party efforts. On CBS, about 71 percent of the stories about the Republican party, in comparison with 62 percent of the stories about the Democratic party, included predominantly favorable crowds. On NBC, 74 percent of the stories about the Republican party, in comparison with 66 percent of the stories about the Democratic party, contained favorable crowds. And on ABC, 69 percent of the Republican stories and 60 percent of the Democratic stories showed predominantly favorable crowds (1976, p. 127).

The event factor, or the nature of the event, emerged once more as an important factor in Paletz and Elson's examination of 1972 Democratic National Convention coverage. They noted that "part of the negative effect obviously was a function of the Democratic convention itself. For the first time in the history of televised conventions, viewers saw and heard (or heard about) such issues as abortion and homosexuality debated on the floor" (1976, p. 128).

Egyptian President Sadat's visit to Israel, has been among the extraordinary events occurring in the Middle East. There was heavy television coverage of that event. O'Conner (1977) wrote that this event "apparently offered little in the way of concrete political resolutions, but it left the world with a new collection of unforgettable images" (p. 17). Bagnied and Scheider's (1981) study of the U.S. television network news coverage of Sadat's visit to Israel and the events surrounding the trip examined the visual images as well as the air time. They found that Sadat was shown on screen more than twice as much as Begin during the period from November 9, 1977, through December 1, 1977. They concluded however, that such a ratio did not indicate an unfair treatment of Begin, for several reasons: the event was understandably considered Sadat's Peace initiative. "It was Sadat who made the trip. He was the first Arab leader to make such a gesture, and he was subjected to bitter threats from certain quarters" (p. 60). Here we have the nature of the event as a strong factor contributing to the visual images.

One of the factors that Bagnied and Scheider's study focused on was "on-camera activity." That is, "how much was each leader shown speaking, interacting with the public, gesturing with arms and hands, sitting being interviewed, or shown as the recipient of public acclaim?" (p. 60). Although Begin was pictured as more than twice as likely to have been lecturing groups of people as Sadat was, the findings of this study show that Sadat was shown as more outgoing, open, gregarious, popular, and active. Furthermore, Sadat was depicted as interacting more, mingling more, consulting assistants more, shaking hands more and listening more to

people (12 percent of his on-camera activity). Sadat was also observed as encountering supportive crowds far more often than Begin was. Unlike Begin, Sadat consistently emerged as the more visually open and expressive leader: he used open-palmed, open-armed gestures (1981, p. 61). If these findings reflect anything, it is that the event factor derived basically from the event itself. According to Diamond and Cassidy (1979), "the figures of Sadat and Begin represented a reversal of symbolic images. Urbanic, pipe-smoking, English-speaking Sadat not only looked western but sounded statesmanlike when he talked of peace. Begin, on the other hand, appeared as a remote, even fanatical figure" (p. 7).

Audiovisual compatibility is another aspect that may contribute to examining event factors in television news. Television is a two-channel medium. Both audio and video contain content that the communicator wants the audience to perceive. From the standpoint of TV viewers, psychological research reveals that the interaction between the audio and video portions of a television newscast may not be a simple one. Selective attention theory shows that human information processing is limited by a restricted capacity filter between the recognition and attentive stages of input analysis, so that only one among the audio and visual channels can be fully analyzed, interpreted or given meaning (Broadbent, 1958).

The development of this theory led to two significant amendments. Unattended channels are not entirely ignored and the low level monitoring of views still continues and switching attention from one channel to another takes time (Davis, Moray, and Treisman, 1961; Broadbent, 1971).



The television producers have taken advantage of the mechanism of the television message to "consciously and effectively employ distractions to minimize the impact of certain messages" (Adams, 1978, p. 165). In an analysis of network Vietnam stories, Frank (1973) discovered that video coverage did not totally parallel the content spoken by correspondents.

The studies cited earlier and others about the interactions between the audio and video portions of TV news stories ignored the contribution of an event factor of visual image or audio-video reinforcement. This study however, hypothesizing that within extraordinary events, reinforcement between the audio and visual content is more likely to occur because television producers have less control to consciously distract the impact of the message.

One of the extraordinary events in the Middle East is the Palestinian uprising of the Occupied Arab Territories, which exploded in December 1987 and has not yet been quenched. This uprising has flooded the U.S. television networks with powerful pictures reflecting the seriousness of the circumstances and the hardships of Palestinian life. These powerful images are assumed in this study to be derived from the nature of the event (event factors).

To determine whether TV coverage of the Palestinian uprising is a one-time event coverage (the event factors), we will compare two types of events during two different time periods in terms of the visual images and the interaction between the audio and visual content:

- 1) extraordinary events, the first year of the Palestinian uprising (January 1, 1988-December 30, 1988) and;

- 2) ordinary events, the year before the Palestinian uprising (December 1, 1986-November 30, 1987).

## Hypotheses

### General hypothesis 1

There is more qualitative and quantitative television coverage of event during the extraordinary period than there is during the ordinary period.

H1a There will be more television news stories covering the first year of the Palestinian uprising than there will be covering the Palestinian-Israeli issue the year before.

H1b There will be more television news stories using video during the first year of the Palestinian uprising than there will be the year before.

H1c Television news stories covering the first year of the Palestinian uprising will be longer than the news stories during the year before.

### General hypothesis 2

There will be more visual images of the nature of the event during an extraordinary period than there are during an ordinary period.

H2a There will be more television news stories depicting Israelis as heavily armed soldiers and Palestinians as unarmed civilians during the first year of the Palestinian uprising than there will be during the year before.

H2b There will be more television news stories of crowds of people during the first year of the Palestinian uprising than there will be during the year before.

**H2c** There will be more television news stories depicting physical clashes between Israeli soldiers and Palestinian civilians during the first year of the Palestinian uprising than there will be during the year before.

**H2d** There will be more television news stories conveying an emotional message during the first year of the Palestinian uprising than there will be the year before.

### General hypothesis 3

The audio and visual content conveys the same picture of reality. If there are differences between the two dimensions, only one can be appropriate (Kepplinger, 1982). Within an extraordinary event, reinforcement between the audio and visual content is more likely to occur because television producers have less control to consciously distract the impact of the message.

**H3** There will be more television news stories conveying audio-visual reinforcement during the first year of the Palestinian uprising than there will be during the year before.

## CHAPTER IV. METHODOLOGY

This chapter is devoted to a discussion of content analysis, objective of the study, unit of analysis, the sample, coders and coding, operational definitions, and data analysis.

This is a content analysis study of how the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS), the American Broadcasting Company (ABC), and the National Broadcasting Company (NBC) covered the Palestinians and the Israelis before and after the *Intifada*.

### The Objectives

The research effort had three major objectives. The first objective attempts to determine the total number of news stories broadcast by ABC, CBS and NBC, how many of these stories were accompanied by video, and the average length of the news stories and other descriptive data the three American television networks aired. The study examines the Israeli-Palestinian conflict during the first year of the Palestinian uprising (the extraordinary event period) and compares the coverage by the same three networks of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict one year prior to the Palestinian uprising (the ordinary event period)

The second objective sought to measure the event factor contribution to the visual images of television news during the year of the Palestinian uprising (the extraordinary event period) compared with the contribution of event factor to visual images of TV news during one year prior to the Palestinian uprising (the ordinary event period).

The final objective attempts to measure the impact of the event factor on the audio-video compatibility of TV news during the first year of the Palestinian uprising (the extraordinary event period) compared with the impact of the event factor during one year prior to the Palestinian uprising (the ordinary event period)

### Content Analysis

This study employs the content analysis method defined by Krippendorff (1980), i.e., a research technique for making replicable and valid references from data to their content. In his precise definition Kerlinger (1973) described three characteristics of the method that require elaboration. The model is 1) systematic—the content to be analyzed should be selected on the basis of explicit and consistently applied rules; 2) objective—the personal bias of the researcher should not enter into the findings; and 3) quantitative—the content should represent messages accurately. This technique has been popularized by the recent concern over the portrayal of violence and the treatment of minority groups on television (Wimmer and Dominick, 1987).

The analysis of content itself, however, does not provide the determinants or consequences of that content.

### Unit of Analysis

In this study, we used the news story as the major unit of analysis. The story was selected as the essential unit of analysis because it is "the smallest, completely self-contained message in a news program" (Hofstetter, 1976, p. 27). For this study, stories were identified and relevant data such as date, network, and length were recorded.

To obtain data, the researcher used Vanderbilt University's Television News Index and Abstract as the source of news. It became necessary to define the boundaries of the news stories presented in the News Index, which arranges newscasts according to news stories or groups of stories separated by headlines. Beneath the headline, each story is tagged "S" for studio or anchor. The names of the anchorperson or correspondents are given in the right margin. In the left margin, the time of the beginning and ending of the story is given.

Stories broadcast in the evening network television news during two years (December 1, 1986-November 30, 1988) were considered as the universe for all obtained data.

### The Sample

There is no perfect method of television news sampling. However, after the available methods were reviewed, stratified sampling seemed most appropriate for this research. According to Rubin (1981), stratified sampling is basically random sampling within various strata or subgroups of populations. It requires classifications categorized into subgroups according to preselected criteria (p. 73). Sample size is also an important factor. Pride and Clarke (1973) selected one day at random from each week through a two-year period. According to Asi (1981), the study of television with the smallest sample is that conducted by Robert Howard, who analyzed the content of network television news for five weekdays March 20-24, 1972. Stempel, in his classic study of sample size, argued that a sample greater than 12 days for the entire year gives little advantage (1952).

The researcher was convinced that, for the purpose of this study, a 24-day period (12 days for each subsample) would be sufficient. The 24-day sample produced two 12-day subsamples. One subsample was drawn from the year before the Palestinian uprising (December 1, 1986-November 30, 1987) and, the other one from the first year after the uprising. One month (December 1987) was not included in the sample because the Palestinian uprising exploded in the middle of this month, which prevented us from classifying this month with either subsample.

Originally, we planned to select the first day from each month throughout the two-year period. Only few news stories fell on that date, so we tried the 15th day of each month, instead. But this did not provide more than five stories in either subsample. Because, this study does not deal with the frequency of news coverage, in each month, we selected the first news story available in the News Index from each of the three television networks for each month. The total news stories making up the first subsample was 16. The total news stories making up the second subsample was 36 (Appendix C).

### Coding and Coders

Coding for hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 1c of this study was accomplished by this researcher because these hypotheses rely on data available in the News Index for the three networks: ABC, CBS, and NBC (Appendix D). However, coding for hypotheses 2a, 2b, 2c, 2d, and 3 was accomplished by coders. Three graduate students from the Department of Journalism and Mass Communication at Iowa State University were asked to participate in the

study as coders. Before the coders met for the first time, the researcher requested and received from Vanderbilt University's News Archive, videotapes of all stories falling on the sampled days that concerned Palestinians and Israelis. The coders were trained and instructed on how to use the instrument before they observed the news stories. They were given operational definition sheets. Coder instruction sheets were distributed (Appendix E). The coders were also instructed to complete specially prepared coding sheets (Appendix F). The coders were trained and instructed on how to code both video and audio as two contents within each news story. After reviewing the visual content and coding each variable (equality of power, crowd, physical clash, and emotional message variables), the audio content of each news story for each variable was coded as either reinforcing or not reinforcing content. Without a certain degree of reliability, decisions reached by the coders would decrease the generalization of these decisions. To measure intercoder reliability, a pretest was conducted before the actual coding took place. There were three pairs of coders pretested. The pretest intercoder reliability of the first pair was .86 percent. The pretest intercoder reliability of the second pair scored .83 percent. The pretest intercoder reliability of the third pair scored .95 percent. The entire intercoder reliability among all coders was .95 percent.

### Operational Definitions

Well-defined concepts and precise vocabulary are a milestone in the process of any research. Therefore, the following definitions were prepared to reflect the exact usage.



**News story:** Any event or incident involving both Palestinian and Israeli individuals, groups, leaders or general affairs was considered a news story and recorded as such.

**Story type:** Any news story reported from outside the studio was recorded as a news story with video. If a news story was read by an anchor sitting in the studio or if it was accompanied by still graphics, it was recorded as a story without video.

**Inequality of power:** Any news story involving armed Israeli soldiers and unarmed Palestinian civilians in a face-to-face position was considered a story implying inequality of power.

**Crowds:** Any news story involving groups of people (not fewer than 10 persons) performing collective activity such as rallies, marches, demonstrations, strikes, or prayers was considered a news story with crowds.

**Physical clashes:** Any physical confrontation involving both Israeli soldiers and Palestinian civilians, such as stories involving chasing, capturing, beating, pushing, pulling, shooting, using tear gas or any type of gas among crowds of civilians, demolishing houses or throwing stones was considered as a news story with a physical clash.

**Emotional message:** Any event indicating emotional dimensions, fear, sadness, or sympathy, such as stories involving weeping, screaming, bleeding, mourning, or self-flagellation was considered as a news story with an emotional message.

Other relevant data such as date, network, and length were also considered.

**Date:** The day, month, and year of each story was considered in a six-digit format. Two digits represented the day, two represented the month and the last two represented the year (Appendix F).

**Network:** Each network for each story was identified by a number. Three networks were included in this category: ABC = 1; CBS = 2; NBC = 3.

**Story duration:** The time length of each story was recorded in seconds. For the entire two years, the researcher found that the shortest story was 10 seconds long and the longest 740 seconds.

### Data Analysis

Data were analyzed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSSx) at the Iowa State University Computation Center. The data we had gathered were nominal and interval.

All of the hypotheses required a statistical procedure. Chi-squares were determined to assess the contribution of each variable. For the first hypothesis, the chi square was computed to test the relationship between the independent variable (two event periods) and the dependent variables (the number of the news stories, and the news accompanied by video). For subhypothesis 1c, a means test was employed to obtain the average of news story length aired by the three networks.

The chi-square was also computed in the second hypothesis to assess the relationship between the the independent variable (two event periods) and the dependent variables (equality of power, crowds, physical clashes, and emotional messages).

Finally the chi-square was computed for the third hypothesis to test the relationship between the independent variable (two event periods) and the dependent variable (audio-visual compatibility).

## CHAPTER V. THE FINDINGS

As indicated earlier, this research had three major objectives. The first objective required no sampling. All news stories aired by ABC, CBS, and NBC and available in the News Index during the two event-periods were recorded. Of these stories, 291 involved the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Chi-square and means tests were used to assess the relationships between independent and dependent variables, with the p level at a standard statistical level ( $p < .05$ ).

The second and third objectives entailed a random stratified sample drawn from the previously mentioned two event-periods. The researcher recorded only 52 news stories. It should be noted that every statistical technique is sensitive to sample size: a large sample produces a difference even if the actual difference is very small, but a small sample produces a statistically significant difference only when the actual difference is great (Singletary and Stone, 1988). Because there was a small sample for the second and third objectives, p level was established at the standard statistical level ( $p < .10$ ). As indicated earlier, to determine whether hypotheses were supported, the chi-square was used to test the relationships between independent and dependent variables.

### General Hypothesis 1

General hypothesis 1 states that there is more qualitative and quantitative television coverage during an extraordinary period than during an ordinary period. It was thus hypothesized that, in comparison with the previous year (December 1, 1986 - November 30, 1987, the ordinary time), the

first year of the Palestinian uprising (January 1, 1988 - December 30, 1988, the extraordinary time) would have a higher rate of qualitative and quantitative television coverage.

### H1a

Hypothesis 1a stated that there would be more television news stories about the Palestinian-Israeli conflict during the first year of the Palestinian uprising than there had been during the year preceding the uprising. Table 3 shows a big difference between the two periods in terms of the total number of news stories reporting the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. While 20 news stories were aired during the ordinary period by the three TV networks, 272 news stories were aired by the same three networks during the extraordinary period. In other words, the three TV networks aired as many as 13 times more news stories during the extraordinary period than during the ordinary period. Therefore, the hypothesis is supported.

Table 3 also shows the differences between the two periods, at the level of each network. With ABC, the number of news stories aired increased from 7 during the ordinary period to 109 during the extraordinary period, which means that ABC aired 15 times more news stories during the extraordinary period than during the ordinary period. With CBS, the number of news stories increased from 6 aired during the ordinary period to 84 during the extraordinary period. CBS broadcast 14 times more news stories during the extraordinary period than during the ordinary period. With NBC, the number of news stories increased from 7 during the ordinary period to 78 during the extraordinary period, which means that NBC aired 11 times more

Table 3. Total number of news stories aired by ABC, CBS, and NBC during two year periods (December 1, 1986-November 30, 1987, and January 1, 1988 - December 30, 1988)

Network	The Two Event-periods		Total
	Stories Before Uprising	Stories During Uprising	
ABC	7	109	116
CBS	6	84	90
NBC	7	78	84
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>272</b>	<b>291</b>

news stories during the extraordinary period than during the ordinary period.

Although these three networks were nearly identical in terms of the number of news stories aired during the first period (ABC = 7, CBS = 6, NBC = 7), there was no such similarity during the second period. ABC aired more news stories (109) than did either CBS (84) or NBC (78).

### H1b

Hypothesis 1b stated that there were more television news stories accompanied by video during the first year of the Palestinian uprising than there had been the year before. To test this hypothesis, a crosstabulation between the number of news stories accompanied by video and the two event-periods was used. Table 4 shows that there is a relationship between the two event-periods and accompanied video of news stories with significance level

Table 4. Crosstabulations between video accompaniment of stories and two event-periods

Video Accompaniment	The Two Event-periods	
	Before Uprising	During Uprising
Stories without video	6 40.0 30.0	9 60.0 3.3
Stories with video	14 5.1 70.0	262 94.9 96.7

Chi-square = 21.93381; D.F. = 1; significance = 0.0000; min E.F. = 1.031; cell with E.F. < 5 = none.

of  $p = 0.0000$ , which is lower than the established  $p$  level ( $p = 0.05$ ). Hence, H1b is supported.

Furthermore, while during the ordinary period the percentage of news stories without video is 30 percent and the percentage of news stories with video is 70 percent in favor of the stories with video, during the extraordinary period the percentage of news stories without video is 3.3 percent and the percentage of news stories with video is 96.7 percent in favor of stories with video (see Table 4).

Networks seem to be quite different in terms of their coverage of the two event-periods crosstabulated by video accompaniment. With ABC, while during the ordinary period the percentage of news stories without video is 42.9 percent and the percentage of news stories with video is 57.1 percent in

favor of stories with video, during the extraordinary period the percentage of news stories without video is 6.6 percent and the percentage of news stories with video is 94.5 percent in favor of the stories with video (see Table 5).

With CBS, while during the ordinary period the percentage of news stories without video is 16.7 percent and the percentage of news stories with video is 83.3 percent in favor of the stories with video, during the extraordinary period the percentage of news stories without video is 2.4 percent and the percentage of news stories with video is 97.6 percent in favor of stories with video (see Table 6).

With NBC, while during the ordinary period the percentage of news stories without video is 28.6 percent and the percentage of news stories with video is 71.4 percent in favor of the stories with video, during the extraordinary period the percentage of news stories without video is 1.3 percent and the percentage of news stories with video is 98.7 percent in favor of the stories with video (see Table 7).

### H1c

Hypothesis 1c states that there were longer television news stories covering the Palestinian-Israeli conflict during the first year of the Palestinian uprising than there had been the year before. To determine the accuracy of this prediction, a means test was used for both periods. Table 8 shows that there is relationship between the two event periods and the news story length with significance level of  $p = 0.000$ , which is lower than the established  $p$  level. Hence, H1c is supported.



Table 5. Crosstabulations between video accompaniment of stories and two event-periods on ABC

Video Accompaniment	The Two Event-periods	
	Before Uprising	During Uprising
Stories without video	3	6
	33.3	66.7
	42.9	6.6
Stories with video	4	103
	3.7	96.3
	57.1	94.5

Table 6. Crosstabulations between video accompaniment of stories and two event-periods on CBS

Video Accompaniment	The Two Event-periods	
	Before Uprising	During Uprising
Stories without video	1	2
	33.3	66.2
	16.7	2.4
Stories with video	5	82
	5.7	94.3
	83.3	97.6

Table 7. Crosstabulations between video accompaniment of stories and two event-periods, on NBC

Video Accompaniment	The Two Event-periods	
	Before Uprising	During Uprising
Stories without video	2 66.7 28.6	1 33.3 1.3
Stories with video	5 6.1 71.4	77 93.9 98.7

Table 8. Means and news story-length during two event-periods

Period	News Stories	Mean (seconds)	Standard Deviation
Before the Uprising	20	39.0000	47.4508
During the Uprising	271	131.1808	97.7709
The total of both periods	291	124.8454	97.9447

Significance = 0.000; F = 17.4326; mean square = 158265.9010

Furthermore, the average news-story length during the extraordinary period was 131.1808 seconds, whereas during the ordinary period it was 39.0000 seconds. These findings indicate that the average length of news stories aired during the period of the uprising was greater than the average length of news stories aired during the period before the uprising.

At the level of each network, average length of news stories was generally greater during the extraordinary period than during the ordinary period (see Table 9).

### General Hypothesis 2

General hypothesis 2 states that the nature of the event is reflected more during the extraordinary period than during the ordinary period.

#### H2a

Hypothesis 2a states that there were more television news stories showing Israelis as heavily armed soldiers and Palestinians as unarmed civilians during the first year of the Palestinian uprising than there were during the year before. To test this hypothesis, a crosstabulation was used between the "power equality" variable and the two event-periods. Table 10 shows that there is no statistical significance in the relationship between the power equality variable and two event-periods variable. The significance level is 1.000, which is greater than the established p level. Therefore, H2a is not supported. However, this test is not scientific because there is an insufficient case (one cell has fewer than five (2) stories).

On the other hand, while during the ordinary period the percentage of the news stories with equality of power is 20 percent and the

Table 9. News story-length means on the three TV networks during the two event-periods

Network	Period	News Stories	Mean (seconds)	Standard Deviation
ABC	Before the Uprising	7	17.1429	7.5593
	During the Uprising	109	124.8624	113.6952
CBS	Before the Uprising	6	38.3333	30.6050
	During the Uprising	84	146.1905	91.6897
NBC	Before the Uprising	7	61.4286	71.7469
	During the Uprising	78	123.8462	77.2621

Table 10. Crosstabulations between two event-periods and "power equality"

Power equality	The Two Event-periods	
	Before Uprising	During Uprising
Stories with equality of power	2	7
	22.2	77.8
	20.0	24.1
Stories without equality of power	8	22
	26.7	73.3
	80.0	75.9

Chi-square = 0.0000; D.F. = 1; significance = 1.0000; min E.F. = 2.308; cell with E.F. < 5 = 1.

percentage of news stories without equality of power is 80 percent in favor of the news stories without equality of power, during the extraordinary period the percentage of news stories with equality of power is 24.1 percent and the percentage of news stories without equality of power is 75.9 percent in favor of stories without equality of power. This can perhaps be interpreted as despite the insufficiency of the cases under examination, there is a light difference between the two periods presenting the contribution of the extraordinary event to TV images. Another interpretation can be attributed to the fact that the inequality of power between the Israelis and the Palestinians has been the case even before the uprising.

## H2b

Hypothesis 2b stated that there were more television news stories presenting crowds during the first year of the Palestinian uprising than there had been during the year before. To test this hypothesis, a crosstabulation was used between "crowds" variable and "two event-periods" variable. Table 11 shows that there is no statistical significance in the relationship between crowds and two event-periods. The significance level is 0.7906, which is greater than the established p level. Therefore, H2b is not supported. However, this test is not scientific because one of the cells has fewer than five (3) stories.

On the other hand, while during the ordinary period the percentage of the news stories with crowds is 72.7 percent and the percentage of the news stories without crowds is 27.3 in favor of the stories with crowds, during the extraordinary period the percentage of news stories with crowds is 82.8

Table 11. Crosstabulations between two event-periods and "crowds"

Crowds	The Two Event-periods	
	Before Uprising	During Uprising
Stories with crowds	8 25.0 72.7	24 75.0 82.8
Stories without crowds	3 37.5 27.3	5 62.5 17.2

Chi-square = 0.07053; D.F. = 1; significance = 0.7906; min E.F. = 2.200; cell with E.F. < 5 = 1.

percent and the news stories without crowds is 17.2 percent in favor of stories with crowds. Despite the insufficiency of the cases under examination, there is a difference between the two periods presenting the contribution of extraordinary event to TV images.

### H2c

Hypothesis 2c states that there were more television news stories presenting physical clashes between the Israeli soldiers and the Palestinians during the first year of the Palestinian uprising than there had been the year before. To test this hypothesis, a crosstabulation was used between physical clashes variable and two event-periods variable. Table 12 shows that there is statistical significance in the relationship between physical clashes and two

Table 12. Crosstabulations between the two event-periods and "physical clash"

Physical Clashes	The Two Event-periods	
	Before Uprising	During Uprising
Stories with physical clash	5 17.9 45.5	23 82.1 79.3
Stories without physical clash	6 50.0 54.5	6 50.0 20.7

Chi-square = 2.88998; D.F. = 1; significance = 0.0891; min E.F. = 3.300; cell with E.F. < 5 = none.

event-periods. The significance level is 0.0891, which is lower than the established p level. Thus, H2c is supported.

Furthermore, while during the ordinary period the percentage of the news stories with physical clashes is 45.5 percent and the percentage of the news stories without physical clash is 54.5 percent in favor of the stories without physical clashes, during the extraordinary period the percentage of the news stories with physical clash is 79.3 percent and the percentage of the news stories without physical clash is 20.7 percent in favor of the stories with physical clashes (see Table 12). This can be attributed to the contribution of the extraordinary event to TV images.

## H2d

Hypothesis 2d states that there were more televised news stories presenting emotional messages during the first year of the Palestinian uprising than there had been the year before. To test this hypothesis, a crosstabulation was used between "emotional message" variable and two event-periods. Table 13 shows that there is statistical significance in the relationship between emotional message and two event-periods. The significance level is 0.0693, which is lower than the established p level. Therefore, H2d is supported. However, this test is not scientific because there are not sufficient cases (one cell has fewer than five (1) stories).

Furthermore, while during the ordinary period the percentage of the news stories with emotional message is 9.1 percent and the percentage of the news stories without emotional message is 90.9 percent in favor of the stories without emotional messages, during the extraordinary period the percentage of the news stories with emotional messages is 46.4 percent and the percentage of the news stories without emotional messages is 53.6 percent in favor of the stories without emotional messages (see Table 13). This can also be attributed to the contribution of the extraordinary event to TV images.

### General Hypothesis 3

General hypothesis 3 states that natural drama, which comes from the event itself, within an extraordinary event reduces the ability of the television producers and reporters to dramatize the events in accordance with their political and ideological attitudes.



Table 13. Crosstabulations between the two event-periods and the "emotional message"

Emotional Message	The Two Event-periods	
	Before Uprising	During Uprising
Stories with emotional message	1	13
	7.1	92.9
	9.1	46.4
Stories without emotional message	10	15
	40.0	60.0
	90.9	53.6

Chi-square = 3.29953; D.F. = 1; significance = 0.0693; min E.F. = 3.949; cell with E.F. < 5 = 1.

### H3a

Hypothesis 3a states that there were more television news stories with audio-visual reinforcement during the first year of the Palestinian uprising than there had been the year before. To test this hypothesis, a crosstabulation was used between "audio-visual reinforcement" variable and "two event-periods" variable. Table 14 shows that there is statistical significance in the relationship between audio-visual reinforcement and two event-periods. The significance level is  $p = 0.0002$ , which is lower than the established  $p$  level. Therefore H3 is supported.

Furthermore, while during the ordinary period the percentage of news stories with audio-visual reinforcement is 29.5 percent and the percentage of

Table 14. Crosstabulations between the "audio-visual reinforcement" and the two event-periods

Audio-visual Reinforcement	The Two Event-periods	
	Before Uprising	During Uprising
Stories with audio-visual reinforcement	13	72
	15.3	84.7
	29.5	63.7
Stories without audio-visual reinforcement	31	41
	43.1	56.9
	70.5	36.3

Chi-square = 13.54925; D.F. = 1; significance = 0.0002; min E.F. = 20.178; cell with E.F. < 5 = none.

the news stories without audio-visual reinforcement is 70.5 percent in favor of the stories without audio-visual reinforcement, during the extraordinary period the percentage of the news stories with audio-visual reinforcement 63.7 percent and the percentage of the news stories without audio-visual reinforcement is 36.3 percent in favor of the stories with audio-visual reinforcement (see Table 14). This can be attributed to the impact of the extraordinary event on the TV coverage.

## CHAPTER VI. DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### Discussion

The purpose of this research was to determine whether there is a long-term shift in the U.S. television coverage of the Middle East conflict, or whether such a shift is derived only from one-time coverage. The justification for understanding this study rested in the potential and importance of event factor impacts on television coverage and the event factor contribution to the visual images of television news and the differences between their impacts and contribution during two different periods: ordinary event period and extraordinary event period.

At the beginning of this section, it would be fruitful to return to the earlier stated three objectives and hypotheses relating to each objective to review and examine the results and some of their implications.

Objective 1 attempted to determine the total number of news stories, how many of them were accompanied by video, the average length of news story and other descriptive data the three TV networks—ABC, CBS, and NBC—devoted to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict during the first year of the Palestinian uprising (the extraordinary event period) compared with the coverage of the same three networks of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict during one year prior to the Palestinian uprising (ordinary event period).

Hypotheses relating to the first objective of this research were stated as follows:

**H1a** There were more television news stories covering the first year of the Palestinian uprising than there had been the year before.

**H1b** There were more television news stories accompanied by video during the first year of the Palestinian uprising than there had been the year before.

**H1c** There were longer averages of television news stories covering the first year of the Palestinian uprising than there had been the year before.

Objective 2 sought to measure the event factor contribution to the visual images of television news during the first year of the Palestinian uprising (the extraordinary event period) compared with the contribution of event factor to visual images of TV news during one year prior to the Palestinian uprising (ordinary event period).

Hypotheses relating to the second objective of this research were stated as follows:

**H2a** There were more television news stories depicting Israelis as armed soldiers and Palestinians as unarmed civilians during the first year of the Palestinian uprising than there had been during the year before.

**H2b** There were more television news stories of crowds of people during the first year of the Palestinian uprising than there had been during the year before.

**H2c** There were more television news stories of physical clashes between the Israelis and the Palestinians during the first year of the Palestinian uprising than there had been during the year before.

**H2d** There were more television news stories presenting emotional messages during the first year of the Palestinian uprising than there had been the year before.

Objective 3 attempted to measure the impact of event factor on the audio-visual reinforcement of television news during the first year of the Palestinian uprising (the extraordinary event period) compared with the impacts of event factor during one year prior to the Palestinian uprising (ordinary event period).

One hypothesis relating to the third objective of this research was stated as follows:

**H3** There were more television news stories with audio-visual reinforcement during the first year of the Palestinian uprising than there had been the year before.

Information relating to H1a of this research showed that the three television networks gave more quantitative coverage (number of news stories) to the conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians during the Palestinian uprising than the three networks gave to the same Israeli-Palestinian conflict during ordinary event period. This means that the quantitative coverage results from a one time event.

The results relating to H1b showed that the three television networks gave more qualitative coverage (video accompaniment) to the conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians during the Palestinian uprising than they gave to the same Israeli-Palestinian conflict during ordinary event period. This means the qualitative coverage also results from a one time-event not.

The results relating to H1c showed that the three television networks gave more quantitative coverage (the length average of the news stories) to the conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians during the Palestinian uprising than they gave to the same Israeli-Palestinian conflict during ordinary event period. This also indicates that this quantitative coverage results from a one time-event.

Data relating to the H2a showed that although the majority of the inequality of power contributing to visual images of TV news was during the extraordinary event period, no statistically significant relationships are discovered between inequality of power and two event periods. This can perhaps be attributed to the fact that the inequality of power between the Israeli soldiers and the Palestinian civilians has been the case even before the uprising, so it did not make a difference within the extraordinary event period.

The results relating to H2b showed that although the percentage of the news stories with crowds was greater during the extraordinary event period than the percentage of news stories with crowd during ordinary event period, no statistically significant relationships are discovered between crowd and two event-periods. This can perhaps be attributed either to the fact that crowd is always an obvious feature of the confrontation between both peoples before and during the uprising or to the insufficient sample size of these data.

The results relating to H2c showed that physical clashes variable was carried by TV news more during the Palestinian uprising than during the year prior to the Palestinian uprising. Therefore, the event factor contribution to visual images of TV news is more likely to be reflected during

an extraordinary event period than during ordinary event period. The event factor contribution to the visual images of television news results also from a one time event .

The results relating to H2d showed that the emotional message variable contributed to visual images of TV news more during the Palestinian uprising than its contribution to the visual images of TV news during the year prior to the Palestinian uprising. The event factor contribution to visual images of TV news result also from a one time event.

The results relating to H3 showed that the three television networks gave more audio-visual reinforcement coverage to the Palestinian uprising than they did the year prior to the Palestinian uprising. Therefore, there is more event factor impact on the coverage of an extraordinary event period. This means that the event factor impact on the news coverage result from a one time event.

This shift in the U.S television coverage of the Middle East conflict in terms of more qualitative and quantitative coverage, more event factor contribution to visual images of television news, more event factor impact on television coverage within extraordinary event results from a one time event. This type of coverage of course does not reflect a long term shift in the U.S television coverage of the Middle East conflict and peoples because there have been several extraordinary events in the Middle East. This suggests that the long term conflict can receive two different types of television coverage. Both coverages are economically beneficial for the TV producers.

1- Current long term coverage is influenced by two factors; the political and ideological attitudes of the anchorpersons, reporters, and producers and

the economic interest based on the audience interest, which in turn leads to advertisers money. Such coverage takes place mostly within ordinary events, television dramatization can be more easily controlled.

2- Short term coverage results from extraordinary events, where there is inexpensive natural drama. This inexpensive natural drama meets the TV producers' interest in drama, but at the same time it is not nearly as subject to the control of TV producers (see Appendix G).

As an organization, a television network has several departments including the news department. "The executive producer is on top of that and news reporters and camera crews are at the bottom" (Asi, 1981, p. 144). Ultimately, the producers and close associates are the ones who decide what news should be broadcast. Their judgments are usually affected by "importance to the domestic public, the number of people affected, audience interest, political balance, dramatic quality, and of course, freshness and timeliness" (Warner, 1968, p. 72).

These dimensions that usually influence the producer's judgments are either causes or effects, or both causes and effects. However, all these dimensions are important in the networks' efforts to attract the money, which the television networks rely on totally to survive.

In this age of technology, with the inexpensive availability of news sources and the easy access to ongoing events, gathering and reporting the news may not be a big financial difficulty. However, presenting the news in a way that differentiates between ABC, CBS, NBC, etc. and attracts a larger audience and consequently more advertisers is the serious financial challenge facing the producers. "The unique character of television coverage



suggests that heroes, conflicts, and dramatic structures will fit together into an overall pattern. Coverage would probably stress emotionalism, destruction, and pathos, at the expense of a more dispassionate discussion of the issue" (Roeh, 1981, p. 76).

The scholars of communication distinguished long time ago between "news and truth, and between information and story journalism" (Nimmo and Combs, 1985, p. 15). The realities formulated through journalism to match the logic in each medium or "media logic." Mead (1934) noted that news has elements of dramatic characters of story journalism. "The media logic may be viewed as the logic of drama. The choices of format for reporting news in a given medium are choices of dramatic presentation" (Nimmo and Combs, 1985, p. 15). Reuven Frank, at the time executive producer for the nightly news programming at NBC, wrote a memo to his staff when they moved from a 15- to 30-minute format in 1963; "Every new story should, without any sacrifice of probity or responsibility display the attributes of fiction, of drama. It should have structure and conflict, problem and denouement, rising action and falling action, a beginning, a middle, and an end. These are not only the essential drama: they are the essential of narrative (Epstein, 1973, pp. 4-5).

However, there are events, where drama does not minimize the presence of the main issue in the news story. These events must be extraordinary in terms of richness and intensity. Such events is a big and an inexpensive fish for the television producers. If TV news has to be dramatized as a TV producer purpose to meet the audience interest and the advertisers' money, the extraordinary event is probably cheaper drama to

feed the mechanism of night television news. This short term policy may sacrifice or contradict a long term policy of the TV network if there is any.

The Middle East conflict "is highly problematic, but some dominant characteristics of television news language have made it even more problematic; or so, at least, it seems" (Roeh, 1981, p. 87). As indicated earlier in this research, Israel has enjoyed American media support and sympathy. This support and sympathy have been established and continued as a result of the factors we mentioned in chapter 1 of this research. These factors have led to created dramatization to benefit Israel and the Israelis during ordinary events especially before the new technology of news media. This dramatization has viewed the Israelis as "victims" and the Arabs as "aggressors" for the long term media policy. However, within the televised extraordinary events, the natural drama replaces the reporters' created dramatization, where the dramatized victims become aggressors and the dramatized aggressors become victims.

Obviously when we compared the qualitative and quantitative coverage, event factor contribution, and the impact of event factor impact on the audio-visual reinforcement during the Palestinian uprising with the same factors before the uprising, we calculated a greater number of news stories, which most of them accompanied by video, and occupied longer time of the newscast during the uprising. This can be interpreted as a decision was made by the producers and the close associates to station network crew, where the extraordinary event takes place. As a result of the available crew, the number of the news stories increases and the video coverage of the events increases. Because the event naturally dramatic which attracts more

audience and advertisers and consumes less money, energy or effort, we found longer news stories occupying newscast, and less created dramatization. This in turn, reduces the ability to intervene in the news story content.

Obviously the reporters intervention was clear within audio-visual reinforcement. During the extraordinary event period, the percentage of the news stories with reinforcement was 63.7 percent compared with 36.3 percent of news stories without audio visual reinforcement. During the ordinary event period, the percentage of the news stories with audio-visual reinforcement was 29.5 percent compared with 70.5 percent of the news stories without audio-visual reinforcement.

The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in the summer of 1979 was an extraordinary event that has contributed to short term coverage of the Middle East.

Beyond specific informational details, many of these stories were structured with an implied plot of aggressors versus victims. Active agents of a powerful part were opposed to passive, suffering participants. In this drama the latter group appeared to bear no responsibility for their fate. This pattern was suggested by both the visual and verbal grammars, and through the interaction of the two (Roeh, 1981, p. 87).

There have been several studies that reached the same conclusions and attribute these conclusions to a new shift in U.S. television coverage of the Middle East conflict. These studies did not examine whether there may be a possible long-term shift, or whether such a shift is derived from a one time event coverage.

After examining the U.S. television coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict during two different periods, this research determines that such shift is derived from a one-time event coverage. While this research attributes this shift to a one time event coverage, it cannot deny if there is a long term shift either resulting directly from the coverage of the Palestinian uprising as extraordinary event, or resulting indirectly from the accumulation coverage of several recent extraordinary events, which may well have influenced American public opinion concerning the Israelis and the Palestinians.

### Conclusions

Based on the findings presented in Chapter 5, certain conclusions can be drawn concerning the three television networks' coverage of the Middle East conflict and the question of whether there is a long-term shift in the U.S. television coverage of the Middle East conflict, or whether such a shift if only derived from one-time event coverage.

The findings show remarkable differences between the Palestinian uprising period and the year before the Palestinian uprising in terms of the qualitative and quantitative coverage (the total number of news stories, the stories accompanied by video, and the average length of news stories), the event factor contribution to the visual images of TV news (inequality of power, crowd, physical clashes, and emotional message variables and emotional messages variables), event factor impact (the audio- visual reinforcement) of television news in favor of the extraordinary event

The current research findings indicate that the media coverage shift, which has been suggested by some recent studies, resulted from a one

time event coverage. Also this research suggests that the short term shift may lead to a long term shift either directly resulting from the Palestinian uprising as an extraordinary event, or indirectly resulting from the accumulation of several recent extraordinary events.

### Recommendations

Understandably, there is no perfect model for solving all questions relevant to the problem under investigation. This research is no exception.

While the current research emphasizes the event factor contribution and impact on TV coverage during two different periods, it does not examine production factor contribution and impact during the two different periods. Therefore, further research about the contributions and the impacts of both factors is recommended.

The current research considered news story as the unit of analysis to examine the relationship between the variables under investigation. For further research, it is recommended that individual scene be the unit of analysis especially with variables such as "audio-visual reinforcement".

While the research attributes the short term coverage shift of long term conflict to the event factor itself, it does not examine the technological impact, which may have contributed to the short term shift of the Middle East coverage. Therefore, further research about media technology impact on changing the coverage is recommended.

Although the researcher was convinced that a 24-day sample would be sufficient to examine event factor contribution and impact during the two different periods, it was realized at the stage of data analysis that the cases

with some variables were not sufficient to scientifically determine relationships between variables under examination. Thus, a larger sample for further research is recommended.

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
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APPENDIX A




Palestine According to United Nations Partition Plan (Source: Epp, *Who's Land is Palestine*)



**APPENDIX B**

## PALESTINIAN NATIONALIST MOVEMENT

Schematic Structure in 1970, as set up by Seventh Palestine National Council  
in Cairo, May 30-June 4, 1970



Source: Ward, Peretz and Wilson *The Palestine State*.

**APPENDIX C**

These are the ABC news stories of the first subsample available in the *News Index*.

Date	Start	Stop	Total Time
Dec 4, 86	5: 52: 50	5: 53: 10	20
Mar 23, 87	5: 33: 00	5: 33: 10	10
May 8, 87	5: 49:10	5: 49: 30	20
Oct 28, 87	5: 49: 20	5: 49: 40	20
Nov 25, 87	5:47:00	5:47:30	30

These are the CBS news stories of the first subsample available in the *News Index*.

Date	Start	Stop	Total Time
Dec 5, 86	5:37:50	5:38:10	20
Jan 9, 87	5:49:20	5:49:50	30
Feb 12, 87	5:41:00	5:41:30	30
May 8, 87	5:46:20	5:46:50	30

These are the NBC news stories of the first subsample available in the *News Index*.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Start</u>	<u>Stop</u>	<u>Total Time</u>
Dec 8, 86	5:46:20	5:48:00	100
Jan 9, 87	5:42:40	5:43:00	20
Apr 13, 87	5:51:20	5:51:50	30
July 1, 87	5:54:30	5:58:00	210
Sep 16, 87	5:45:30	5:45:50	30
Oct 14, 87	5:44:10	5:46:10	130
Nov 25, 87	5:47:10	5:47:20	10

These are the ABC news stories of the second subsample available in the *News Index*.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Start</u>	<u>Stop</u>	<u>Total Time</u>
Jan 4, 88	5:41:30	5:46:30	300
Feb 1, 88	5:38:30	5:40:50	140
Mar 2, 88	5:41:20	5:43:00	100
Apr 1, 88	5:46:40	5:49:00	140
May 4, 88	5:32:10	5:32:50	40
June 6, 88	5:44:00	5:45:10	70
July 5, 88	5:46:30	5:49:10	160
Aug 1, 88	5:30:00	5:34:00	240
Sep 15, 88	5:50:50	5:51:10	20
Oct 7, 88	5:45:50	5:46:10	20
Nov 8, 88	5:51:10	5:52:30	80
Dec 5, 88	5:46:00	5:46:20	20

These are the CBS news stories of the second subsample available in the *News Index*.

Date	Start	Stop	Total Time
Jan 1, 88	5:37:20	5:40:10	170
Feb 1, 88	5:39:10	5:39:20	10
Mar 1, 88	5:32:50	5:34:30	100
Apr 1, 88	5:41:30	5:44:20	170
May 17, 88	5:46:00	5:48:30	150
June 6, 88	5:34:20	5:43:40	560
July 21, 88	5:47:00	5:49:10	130
Aug 1, 88	5:49:30	5:51:50	140
Sep 2, 88	5:40:00	5:43:40	220
Oct 7, 88	5:49:20	5:52:50	210
Nov 8, 88	5:47:20	5:49:20	120
Dec 9, 88	5:38:40	5:41:50	190

These are the NBC news stories of the second subsample available in *News Index*.

Date	Start	Stop	Total Time
Jan 4, 88	5:42:50	5:45:10	140
Feb 1, 88	5:40:10	5:42:10	120
Mar 4, 88	5:43:10	5:46:00	170
Apr 1, 88	5:37:40	5:39:30	110
May 6, 88	5:39:20	5:39:40	20
June 3, 88	5:34:20	5:36:50	150
July 19, 88	5:44:10	5:45:30	80
Aug 1, 88	5:37:10	5:41:10	240
Sep 28, 88	5:39:50	5:42:00	130
Oct 7, 88	5:47:00	5:49:30	150
Nov 8, 88	5:49:30	5:51:00	90
Dec 9, 88	5:40:10	5:42:30	140



**APPENDIX D**

News Stories During the Entire Two Year Sample

Subsample one (December 1, 1986 - November 30, 1987)

	ABC			CBS			NBC		
	Story	Video	Length (Seconds)	Story	Video	Length (Seconds)	Story	Video	Length (Seconds)
01 Dec 4, 86	2	2	20						
02 Dec 5, 86				1	0	20			
03 Dec 8, 86	1	0	20				1	1	100
04 Dec 9, 86				1	1	100			
05 Dec 11, 86				1	1	20			
06 Dec 28, 86									
07 Jan 9, 87				1	1	30	1	1	20
08 Feb 18, 87				1	1	30			
09 Mar 23, 87	1	0	10						
10 April 13, 87							1	1	30
11 May 8, 87	1	1	20	1	1	30			
12 July 1, 87							1	1	210
13 Sep 16, 87							1	0	30
14 Oct 14, 87							1	1	130
15 Oct 28, 87	1	1	20						
16 Nov 25, 87	1	0	30				1	0	10
TOTAL	7	4		6	5		7	5	

Subsample two (January 1, 1988 - December 30, 1988)

	ABC			CBS			NBC		
	Story	Video	Length (Seconds)	Story	Video	Length (Seconds)	Story	Video	Length (Seconds)
001 Jan 1, 88				1	1	170			
002 " 4, "	1	1	300	1	1	120	1	1	140
003 " 5, "				1	1	140	1	1	150
004 "6, "	1	1	220	1	1	280			
005 " 7, "	1	1	210	1	1	140	1	1	20
006 " 8, "	1	1	120	1	1	30	1	1	180
007 " 11, "	1	1	150	1	1	140	1	1	140
008 " 12, "	1	1	130	1	1	160	1	1	20
009 " 13, "	1	1	150	1	1	360	1	1	180
010 " 14, "	1	1	340	1	1	170	1	1	340
011 " 15, "	1	1	110	1	1	120	1	1	20
012 " 18, "	1	1	350				1	1	150
013 " 19, "				1	1	20	1	1	110
014 " 20, "				1	1	20			
015 " 21, "	1	1	40				1	1	20
016 " 22, "	1	1	40	1	1	140	1	1	150
017 " 26, "				1	1	140	1	0	20
018 " 27, "	1	1	220	1	1	40	1	1	160

Subsample two (January 1, 1988 - December 30, 1988)

	ABC			CBS			NBC		
	Story	Video	Length (Seconds)	Story	Video	Length (Seconds)	Story	Video	Length (Seconds)
019 Jan 28, "	1	1	30	1	1	130	1	1	270
020 "29, "	1	1	370	1	1	110			
021 Feb 1, "	1	1	140	1	0	20	1	1	120
022 " 2, "	1	1	140	1	0	10			
023 " 3, "				1	1	270	1	1	30
024 " 4, "							1	1	80
025 " 5, "	1	1	140						
026 " 8, "	1	1	70				1	1	130
027 " 9, "	1	0	10	1	1	320			
028 " 10, "	1	1	30	1	1	20	1	1	150
029 " 12, "				1	1	170	1	1	20
030 " 15, "	1	1	90	1	1	150	1	1	200
031 " 16, "	1	1	80				1	1	10
032 " 17, "				1	1	120	1	1	160
033 " 19, "	1	1	100	1	1	170			
034 " 22, "	1	1	30				1	1	10
035 " 23, "	1	1	130	1	1	30	1	1	
036 " 24, "	1	1	20	1	1	180	1	1	20

Subsample two (January 1, 1988 - December 30, 1988)

	ABC			CBS			NBC		
	Story	Video	Length (Seconds)	Story	Video	Length (Seconds)	Story	Video	Length (Seconds)
037 Feb 25, "	1	1	230	1	1	280	1	1	200
038 " 26, "	1	1	200	1	1	200	1	1	120
039 " 29, "	1	1	140	1	1	10	1	1	180
040 Mar 1, 1988				1	1	100			
041 " 2, "	1	1	100	1	1	120			
042 " 4, "	1	1	110	1	1	10	1	1	170
043 " 7, "	1	1	130	1	1	290	1	1	150
044 " 8, "	1	1	250	1	1	170	1	1	140
045 " 9, "	1	1	10				1	1	150
046 " 10, "	1	1	80						
047 " 11, "	1	1	30	1	1	150			
048 " 14, "	1	1	130	1	1	140			
049 " 15, "	1	1	10	1	1	170			
050 " 16, "	1	1	20	1	1	10	1	1	60
051 " 18, "	1	1	30						
052 " 21, "	1	1	250	1	1	170	1	1	80
053 " 22, "									
054 " 23, "	2	2	100	2	2	160	1	1	30

Subsample two (January 1, 1988 - December 30, 1988)

	ABC			CBS			NBC		
	Story	Video	Length (Seconds)	Story	Video	Length (Seconds)	Story	Video	Length (Seconds)
054 Mar 24, "	1	1	30	1	1	120	1	1	110
055 " 28, "	1	1	110	1	1	120	1	1	100
056 " 29, "	1	1	110	1	1	30	1	1	30
057 " 30, "	1	1	110	1	1	180	1	1	140
058 " 31, "	1	1	90	1	1	30	1	1	20
059 Apr 1, "	1	1	140	1	1	170	1	1	110
060 " 4, "	1	1	240	1	1	160	1	1	180
061 " 5, "							1	1	40
062 " 6, "	1	1	180	1	1	130	1	1	180
063 " 7, "	1	1	190	1	1	190	1	1	260
064 " 8, "	1	1	120	1	1	150	1	1	120
065 " 11, "	1	1	170	1	1	140	1	1	150
066 " 12, "	1	1	20						
067 " 13, "	1	1	10						
068 " 18, "	1	1	280				1	1	100
069 " 19, "	1	1	20	1	1	20			
070 " 20, "	1	1	200	1	1	110			
071 " 21, "	1	1	320	1	1	290	1	1	150

Subsample two (January 1, 1988 - December 30, 1988)

	ABC			CBS			NBC		
	Story	Video	Length (Seconds)	Story	Video	Length (Seconds)	Story	Video	Length (Seconds)
072 Apr 22, "	1	1	80				1	1	20
073 " 26, "	1	1	20	1	1	20	1	1	150
074 " 27, "	2	2	240						
075 " 28, "	1	1	230						
076 May 4, "	1	0	40						
077 " 6, "	1	1	100				1	1	20
078 " 9, "	1	1	30				1	1	40
079 " 13, "							1	1	130
080 " 16, "	1	1	20						
081 " 17, "	1	1	230	1	1	150			
082 Jun 3, 1988							1	1	150
083 " 6, "	1	1	70	1	1	560			
084 " 7, "	1	1	90	1	1	200	1	1	120
085 " 9, "	1	1	210						
086 " 10, "	1	1	110						
087 " 13, "	1	1	30	1	1	130	1	1	30
088 " 14, "	1	1	130						
089 " 20, "	1	1	140	1	1	130	1	1	150

## Subsample two (January 1, 1988 - December 30, 1988)

	ABC			CBS			NBC		
	Story	Video	Length (Seconds)	Story	Video	Length (Seconds)	Story	Video	Length (Seconds)
090 June 22, "	1	1	100						
091 " 23, "	1	1	90				1	1	40
092 " 24, "	1	1	120	1	1	110	1	1	130
093 " 28, "									
094 July 5, "	1	1	160						
094 " 11, "	1	1	20						
095 " 21, "	1	1	20	1	1	130			
096 " 25, "	1	1	120	1	1	150			
097 Aug 1, "	1	1	240	1	1	140	1	1	240
098 " 10, "	1	1	300				1	1	140
099 " 16, "				1	1	140			
100 " 22, "	1	1	20						
101 " 24, "	1	1	20	1	1	20			
102 " 26, "	1	1	10						
103 " 31, "	1	1	20						
104 Sep 2, "				1	1	220			
105 " 15, "	1	0	20						
106 " 26, "	1	1	120	1	1	30			



Subsample two (January 1, 1988 - December 30, 1988)

	ABC			CBS			NBC		
	Story	Video	Length (Seconds)	Story	Video	Length (Seconds)	Story	Video	Length (Seconds)
107 Sep 27, "	1	1	20	1	1	120			
108 " 28, "							1	1	130
109 Oct 7, "	1	0	20	1	1	210	1	1	150
110 " 10, "				1	1	200			
111 " 18, "	1	1	120				1	1	130
112 " 24, "							1	1	160
113 " 26, "	1	1	10	1	1	20	1	1	10
114 Nov 8, "	1	1	80	1	1	120	1	1	90
115 " 11, "				1	1	130	1	1	200
116 " 15, "	1	1	230	1	1	350	1	1	350
117 " 18, "	1	1	100						
118 " 21, "									
119 " 25, "	1	1	10						
120 " 30, "	1	1	20						
121 Dec 5, 1988	1	0	20						
122 " 7, "	1	1	170						
123 " 9, "	1	1	130	1	1	190	1	1	140
124 " 12, "				1	1	210			

Subsample two (January 1, 1988 - December 30, 1988)

	ABC			CBS			NBC		
	Story	Video	Length (Seconds)	Story	Video	Length (Seconds)	Story	Video	Length (Seconds)
125 Dec 13, "	1	1	500	1	1	230	1	1	240
126 " 14, "	1	1		1	1		1	1	220
127 " 15, "									
128 " 16, "	1	1	220	1	1	230	1	1	170
129 " 19, "	1	1	150						
130 " 27, "							1	1	260
TOTAL	109	104		84	82		78	77	

**APPENDIX E**

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### Coder Instructions

Please read these instructions and keep in mind while coding.

1. The objective of this coding is to record your general impressions of each news story. Please record your decisions of each category based on the entire scenes of each news story.
2. Please, while coding, watch the video at all times. Your decision has to be based on both the audio and video dimensions of each news story.
3. Don't let extraneous factors, the personality of the anchor-person or reporter to sway your coding decision. The emphasis during this coding process is on the nature of the event factors.
4. Please code individually. If any problem arises, bring it to the researcher's attention.
5. You need to always keep in mind the definitions of inequality of power, crowds, physical clashes, emotional message in addition to date, network, and length.

**APPENDIX F**

No. \_\_\_\_\_

## Data Collection Sheet

1. Date | \_\_\_\_ | \_\_\_\_ | \_\_\_\_ |
2. Story start \_\_\_\_\_ story stop \_\_\_\_\_ length \_\_\_\_\_
3. Network is \_\_\_\_\_:  
ABC = 1, CBS = 2, NBC = 3
4. Story is \_\_\_\_\_:  
Before the uprising = 1  
After the uprising = 2
5. Story is \_\_\_\_\_:  
with film = 1  
without film = 2

## # Video

## # Audio

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>6. Story is ____:<br/>with equality of power = 1<br/>without equality of power = 2</li> <li>8. Story is ____:<br/>with crowds = 1<br/>without crowds = 2</li> <li>10. Story is ____:<br/>with physical clashes = 1<br/>without physical clashes = 2</li> <li>12. Story is ____:<br/>with emotional message = 1<br/>without emotional message = 2</li> </ol> | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>7. Story is ____:<br/>reinforcing = 1<br/>none reinforcing = 2</li> <li>9. Story is ____:<br/>reinforcing = 1<br/>none reinforcing = 2</li> <li>11. Story is ____:<br/>reinforcing = 1<br/>none reinforcing = 2</li> <li>13. Story is ____:<br/>reinforcing = 1<br/>none reinforcing = 2</li> </ol> |
|--|--|
14. Please add any further comments you may have about any news story:

Coder initials \_\_\_\_\_

Coder initials \_\_\_\_\_

**APPENDIX G**

## TV Coverage of Long Term Conflict

